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1. INTRODUCTION 
On 23 September 1991 the Commission concluded an Agreement with the 
Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws1 ("the 1991 Agreement"), the aim of which is to promote cooperation 
between the competition authorities. By a joint decision of the Council and the 
Commission of 10 April 19952 the Agreement was approved and declared applicable 
from the date it was signed by the Commission. 
On 8 October 1996 the Commission adopted the first report on the application of 
the Agreement for the period of 10 April 1995 to 30 June 19963. The second report 
completes the 1996 calendar year, covering the period of 1 July 1996 to 31 December 
19964. The present report covers the calendar year from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 
1997. This report should be read in conjunction with the first report which sets out in 
detail the benefits, but also the limitations of this kind of cooperation. 
1
 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the 
European Communities regarding the application of their competition laws (OJ L 95, 27.4.95, pp.47 
and 50) 
2
 See OJ L 95, 27.4.95, pp.45 and 46. 
3 Com(96) 479 final, see XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 299-311. 
4
 Com(96) 346 final, see XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 312-318. 
2. MAIN AREAS OF COOPERATION UNDER THE 1991 AGREEMENT 
Case specific EC/US cooperation pursuant to the provisions of the 1991 
Agreement is carried out in the following main areas: 
° notification of cases handled by the competition authorities of one party, when 
these cases concern important interests of the other Party (Article II), and 
exchange of information on general matters relating to the implementation of the 
competition rules (Article III); 
The exchange of basic information in the form of notification, or in less formal 
ways, is the clearest obligation stemming from the agreement. The agreement 
provides for an alert system whereby each party notifies its partner when it deals 
with cases which may affect important interests of the latter. Successive 
notifications may occur in the same case: e.g. in a merger case we shall notify at 
the outset of the case, then, when appropriate, when the Commission decides to 
initiate proceedings and, eventually, " far enough in advance ...to enable the other 
Party's views to be taken into account", before a final decision is adopted. 
° coordination of the actions of both Parties' competition authorities (Article IV); 
Provisions on coordination of enforcement activities are also very important. In 
all cases of mutual interest it has become the norm to establish contacts at the 
outset in order to exchange views and, when appropriate, to coordinate 
enforcement activities. The respective approaches on the definition of relevant 
markets are very often central to the discussions. The parties will often exchange 
views on possible remedies in order to ensure that they do not conflict. 
Cooperation may also, in certain cases, help to clarify a point of foreign law 
relevant to the interpretation of an agreement or to the effectiveness of a remedy. 
Factual elements relevant to the case are also exchanged within the limits of legal 
constraints on the protection of confidential information. Cooperation under this 
heading has recently involved a successful synchronisation of investigations and 
searches5. This is designed to make fact-finding action more effective. It also 
helps prevent companies suspected of cartel activity from destroying evidence 
located in the territory of the agency investigating the same conduct after its 
counterpart on the other side of the Atlantic has acted. 
° so-called "traditional comity" provisions by virtue of which each Party 
undertakes to take into account the important interests of the other Party when it 
takes measures to enforce its competition rules (Article VI); 
The parties are, for instance, within the realm of traditional comity when they 
cooperate in a certain case to bring their respective positions and remedies closer 
to each other in order to avoid creating a harmful effect to the market of the 
partner. Each party may draw the attention of the partner to its concerns in a 
certain case. This may open a new trail for the partner's investigation and lead to 
The case is still pending and can not, at this stage, be included in this report for reasons of 
confidentiality. Details of EC/US cooperation on this case will be included in the first annual report 
following the closure of the case. 
a final result taking the other party's interests into consideration in a more 
appropriate way. 
so-called "positive comity" provisions by virtue of which either party can invite 
the other Party to take, on the basis of the latter's legislation, appropriate 
measures regarding anti-competitive behaviour implemented on its territory and 
which affects the important interests of the requesting Party (Article V). 
Activation of the positive comity provision was felt appropriate for the first time 
in a recent case. The US authorities requested the Commission to investigate 
specific allegations of discrimination regarding the operation of a computerised 
reservation system (Amadeus) set up by Lufthansa, Air France and Iberia. The 
Commission is currently investigating the case in close cooperation with the DoJ. 
the Agreement makes clear that none of its provisions may be interpreted in a 
manner which is inconsistent with the legislation in force in the European Union 
and the United States of America (Article IX). 
3. RULES REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
Currently the most intensive case related6 cooperation between the European 
Commission and competition authorities in third countries is carried out either on the 
basis of specific bilateral agreements (1991 EC/US Competition Cooperation 
Agreement7; and in the near future: Proposed EC/US Positive Comity Agreement8, Draft 
EC/Canadian Competition Cooperation Agreement), or under the 1995 OECD 
Recommendation9. 
All these instruments provide explicitly10 under the heading "Confidentiality and 
Use of Information" that: 
"... neither Party is required to disclose information to the other Party where such 
disclosure is prohibited by the laws of the Party possessing the information or would 
be incompatible with that Party's important interests." 
The first and (up to now) most comprehensive clarification regarding the scope of 
the protection of confidential information is contained in the "Statement on 
6
 It is mainly the cooperation regarding specific pending cases which can give rise to issues of 
protection of confidential information. 
7
 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the European Communities 
regarding the application of their competition laws (OJ L 95, 27.4.95, pp. 47-50 as corrected by OJ L 
131\38 of 15.6.95). 
8
 COM (97) 233. 
9
 Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on 
Anticompetitive Practices affecting International Trade, 27 and 28 July 1995 - C(95)130. 
10
 i) Article VIII of the 1991 EC/US Agreement, ii) Article V of the Proposed EC/US Positive Comity 
Agreement, iii) Section 10 of the Draft EC/Canadian Agreement, and iv) Section 10 of the Guiding 
Principles annexed to the 1995 OECD Recommendation. 
Confidentiality of Information" made by the Commission to the Council during the 
adoption on 10.04.1995 of the Joint Council and Commission Decision regarding the 
entry into force of the 1991 EC/US Agreement. 
In this Statement the Commission distinguishes between two types of information 
which may, under different circumstances, be considered confidential. 
First, information acquired by the Commission and the authorities of the Member 
States in the course of an investigation and which is of the kind covered by professional 
secrecy is subject to Article 20 of Council Regulation 17/62 and to similar provisions in 
the equivalent implementing Regulations. Essentially, this refers to information which is 
not in the public domain and which may be discovered during the course of an 
investigation or which may be voluntarily notified to the Commission under Regulation 
17/62 or in reply to a request for information. This information also includes business or 
trade secrets. Such information is not be disclosed to the US antitrust authorities save 
with the express agreement of the source concerned. 
Second, there is information which relates to the conduct of an investigation or 
the possible conduct of an investigation and which is not subject to Article 20 of 
Regulation 17/62 or to similar provisions in the equivalent implementing Regulations. 
Such information includes the fact of the investigation taking place, the subject-matter of 
the investigation (for example, an agreement on prices or sharing out of markets or abuse 
of a dominant position, such as tied selling or discriminatory prices), the identity of the 
undertaking being investigated and the steps which it is proposed to take in the course of 
the investigation. This information is kept confidential to ensure the proper handling of 
the investigation. However, it may be communicated to the US competition authorities 
as these are obliged to maintain the confidentiality of the information under the terms of 
Articles VTII and IX of the Agreement and by the exchange of letters between the 
parties. 
As regards the notifications carried out between the two Parties (under Article 
11(4) of the 1991 Agreement), these notifications do not include either the draft statement 
of objections, or any other confidential element. The undertakings concerned are 
informed of the existence of such notifications, at the latest when the statement of 
objections is issued. 
In general it must be noted that, where it is appropriate to provide confidential 
information to the US antitrust authorities in order to keep them informed of a 
development in a specific case, the consent of the source of that information must be 
obtained by the means of a waiver. Community law provides a high level of protection to 
confidential information provided to the Commission, and it will be necessary that any 
consent obtained is sufficient to discharge the Commission from its obligation of 
confidentiality as provided by general principles of Community Law, the case law of the 
European Court of Justice and Article 20 of Regulation No. 17. 
The envisaged EC/US Positive Comity Agreement, makes it clear that 
information provided under these instruments may only be used for their implementation 
unless the competition authority that provided the information has consented to another 
use. A further safeguard is provided to those who have consented to certain confidential 
information being disclosed, in that such information may not be used for any other 
purpose unless the competition authority and the source of the information consent. 
4. RULES REGARDING TRANSPARENCY 
Member States are kept informed of cooperation activities under the 1991 EC/US 
Agreement in accordance to the "Statement on Transparency" made by the Commission 
to the Council during the adoption on 10.04.1995 of the Joint Council and Commission 
Decision regarding the entry into force of the 1991 EC/US Agreement. 
Pursuant to this Statement the Commission forwards to the Member State or 
Member States whose interests are affected the notification sent by the Commission or 
received from the US competition authorities under the 1991 EC/US Agreement. 
Member States are notified as soon as is reasonably possible in the language of the 
exchange. Where the Commission sends information to the US authorities, Member 
States are notified at the same time. 
The Commission also notifies the Member State or Member States whose 
interests are affected of any cooperation or coordination of enforcement activities, as 
soon as is reasonably possible. 
It is considered that the interests of a Member State are affected where the 
enforcement activities in question. 
° are relevant to the enforcement activities of the Member State; 
° involve anticompetitive activities (other than a merger or acquisition) carried out 
in the Member State's territory; 
° involve a merger or acquisition in which one or more of the parties to the 
transaction, or a company controlling one or more parties to the transaction, is a 
company incorporated or organized under the laws of the Member State; 
° involve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by the 
Member State; 
° involve remedies that would, in significant respects, require, or prohibit conduct 
in the Member State's territory. 
In addition, at least twice a year at meetings of government competition 
specialists, the Commission will inform all the Member States about the implementation 
of the Agreement, and particularly about the contacts which have taken place with the 
US authorities as regards the forwarding to the Member States of information received 
by the Commission under the Agreement. 
5. CASE SPECIFIC COOPERATION WITHIN 1997 
The cases listed below are those which fall directly under the EC/US Agreement. 
Some cases in the aviation sector for example, are dealt with by another Agency, the US 
Department of Transportation (the DoT). The DoT does not formally cooperate with the 
Commission directly, but does do so indirectly, through the DoJ. There are therefore 
informal contacts between the Commission and the DoT. These cases are not discussed 
in this report. 
5.1 Statistical information 
a) Number of cases notified by the Commission and by the US 
There were the total of forty-two notifications made by the Commission during 
the period between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 1997. The cases are divided into 
merger and non-merger cases and are listed in the Annex 1. 
The Commission received the total of thirty-six notifications from the US 
authorities during the same period. Twenty-four were received from the US Department 
of Justice ("the DoT') and twelve from the US Federal Trade Commission ("the FTC"). 
A list of these cases is found in the Annex 2, again broken down in merger and non-
merger cases. 
Merger cases made up the majority of all notifications in both directions. There 
were thirty-one merger notifications by the Commission and twenty by the US 
authorities. 
The figures given represent the number of cases in which one (or more) 
notifications took place and not the total number of individual notifications. Under 
Article II of the Agreement, notifications are made at certain stages of the procedure and 
so several notifications may be made concerning the same case. For instance, in the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case the Commission sent seven notifications to the US 
authorities and received six notifications from the FTC on the same case. 
Table J sets out in figures the number of cases notified under the 1991 EC/US 
Agreement during the period of 1 January 1997 to 31 December 1997. Table 2 sets out in 
figures the number of cases notified since 23 September 1991. 
Table J 
CASES NOTIFIED 
Year No. of EC No. of US No. of merger 
notifications notifications notifications 
FTC DoJ 
1997 42 12 24 30 (EC) 20 (US) 
* * * 
Table 2 
CASES NOTIFIED 
Year No. of EC No. of US No. of merger 
notifications notifications notifications 
FTC DoJ 
1991 5 
1992 26 
1993 44 
1994 29 
1995 42 
1996 48 
1997 42 
10 2 (=12) 3 (EC) +9 (US) 
20 20 (=40) 11 (EC)+ 31 (US) 
22 18 (=40) 20 (EC) + 20 (US) 
16 19 (=35) 18 (EC)+ 20 (US) 
14 21 (=35) 31 (EC)+ 18 (US) 
20 18 (=38) 35 (EC) + 27 (US) 
12 24 (=36) 30 (EC) + 20 (US) 
b) Notifications by the Commission to Member States 
The text of the interpretative letter sent by the European Communities to the US 
(as well as the Statement on Transparency made by the Commission to the Council on 10 
April 1995, see point 4 above) provides that the Commission, after notice to the US 
Competition authorities, will inform the Member State or Member States, whose 
interests are affected, of the notifications sent to it by the US antitrust authorities. Thus, 
when notifications are received from the US Authorities, they are forwarded immediately 
to the relevant units of DGIV and at the same time copies are sent to the Member States, 
if any, whose interests are affected. Equally, at the same time that DG IV makes 
notifications to the US authorities, copies are sent to the Member State(s) whose interests 
are affected. 
In most instances, the US authorities also notify the Member States directly, 
under the OECD Recommendation11. During the period under review 24 cases were 
notified to the United Kingdom, 21 to Germany, 10 to France, 9 to the Netherlands, 2 to 
Denmark, 2 to Finland, 2 to Italy and 1 to Portugal and Spain each. 
11
 Revised recommendation of the OECD Council concerning cooperation between Member countries on 
anti-competitive practices affecting international trade, adopted 27/28 July 1995 
5.2 Substantive aspects of case-specific cooperation12 
During the year 1997 cooperation between the Commission's officials and their 
counterparts in the United States continued to be productive. The 1991 Agreement offers 
a framework for a meaningful and useful cooperation regarding competition cases of 
mutual interest to the two sides. This type of cooperation and coordination of 
enforcement activities has been beneficial to both competition authorities and companies 
involved. 
a) The Boeing/MDD merger13 
EC/US cooperation in the Boeing/MDD merger was particularly intensive. 
The US Department of Defense and Department of Justice, on behalf of the US 
Government, informed the European Commission of concerns that (i) a decision 
prohibiting the proposed merger could harm important US defence interests, (ii) despite 
any measures the Commission could impose on a third party purchaser, a divestiture of 
Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC, the civil aircraft branch of McDonnell Douglas) 
would be likely to be unsuccessful in preserving DAC as a stand alone manufacturer of 
new aircraft, resulting in an inefficient disposition of whatever of DAC s new aircraft 
manufacturing operations that potentially could be salvaged by Boeing, and in the loss of 
employment in the United States, and (iii) any divestiture of DAC to a third party that 
would not operate DAC as a manufacturer of new aircraft would be anticompetitive in 
that it would create a firm with the incentive and means to raise price and diminish 
service in respect of the provision of spare parts and service to DAC's fleet-in-service, a 
large portion of which is owned by US airlines. 
The Commission took the above concerns into consideration to the extent 
consistent with Community law. In particular, as far as US defence interests were 
concerned, the Commission has limited the scope of its action to the civil side of the 
operation. The Commission has not pursued further the concerns it expressed in its 
Statement of Objections concerning the effect of the concentration on the international 
market for fighter aircraft. As far as DAC is concerned, the Commission has not 
considered a divestiture as a remedy to resolve the competition problems created by the 
concentration. 
Although this case had its own difficulties, the authorisation under the conditions 
put forward by the Commission at the end of its investigation ensured that effective 
competition was maintained on the market for large commercial aircraft. 
12
 This report concentrates on aspects of case handling related to the EC/US cooperation. For more 
information on a particular case see the XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy. 
13
 For more details on this case see among other sources: A.Schaub, "International cooperation in 
antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD proceedings", Competition Policy 
Newsletter, nr. 1/1998 (February), pp. 2-6. 
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b) Cooperation in other major cases 
i) Aspects related to the product market 
Discussions between the case handlers frequently focus on the product market to 
determine whether both sides have arrived at similar conclusions. These discussions are 
based on general information which is publicly available. Undoubtedly these kind of 
exchanges have disclosed a high degree of similarity between the market analyses of the 
Commission and the US authorities. 
This is very important, given the need to have meaningful exchanges while 
observing the rules on confidentiality. If the Commission and the US authorities took 
different initial views on market definition, it might not be possible to explore fully the 
reasons for the different approaches without discussing confidential information which 
the parties had provided. Under our present rules this could only be done with the 
agreement of the parties. 
There were frequent contacts between EC officials and the Department of Justice 
in the course of the investigation of the then proposed BT/MCI merger. Meetings 
between the two sides were held in both Washington and Brussels. Because the case 
required assessment of product markets related to the offering of transatlantic telephony 
services, and in particular consideration of the impact of the merger against the 
background of international accounting rate arrangements, the discussions between the 
two sides were helpful not only in terms of refining market definitions, but also in 
pooling knowledge about the regulatory background on each side of the Atlantic. 
Also in the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan case there was a good deal of 
discussion between Commission officials and their opposite numbers in the United States 
regarding the different relevant product markets which led to compatible remedies. 
In the Santa Cruz/Microsoft case there were no 
differences of opinion on market definition. Also in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case 
both the FTC and the Commission reached the same product market definition of "large 
commercial aircrafts". After exchanging views on how to define markets for PET film 
and Titanium Dioxide in the DuPont/ICI case, certain potential differences were noticed 
both on demand side and on supply side substitutability in the US and in the EC. 
Although the EC and US authorities used sometimes different product market 
definitions for their respective assessments, the contacts between them served the 
purpose of allowing each to understand the thinking of the other, and to refine their 
analyses accordingly. Close cooperation allowed the two sides to avoid conflicting 
decisions. 
ii) Aspects related to the geographical market 
Discussion of the geographical market tends to be more limited, as usually the 
Commission and the US authorities are concentrating on the competitive effects of the 
behaviour or transaction on their own markets, even in cases where the activity under 
investigation is organized on a transatlantic or worldwide scale. 
11 
However, in the Boeing/MDD and the GE Aircraft Engines/Pratt & Whitney 
cases the same geographical market definition of global market was retained by both 
sides. In the case of DuPont/ICI there was an exchange of views on whether the US and 
EC markets for both products, PET and Titanium Dioxide, should be regarded as distinct 
or comprised within a world-wide dimension. 
iii) Aspects related to the anti-competitive effects 
In the Santa Cruz/Microsoft case general discussion established that the 
Commission and its US counterpart at the staff level had largely similar views of the 
facts.-The Guinness/Grand Metropolitan case was a good example of complementary 
analyses of anticompetitive effects. In that case agreement on market definition led to 
agreement on competitive effects and ultimately to a common remedy. 
Commission/FTC consultations led each side to take greater account of concerns 
raised by the other concerning the potential anticompetitive effects of the merger. The 
FTC took a more critical view of Boeing's exclusive agreements as its investigation 
progressed. 
iv) Ascertaining law and fact in the other jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction to deal with a specific case was not challenged from either the US or 
the Commission's side. Exchanges of information and discussions took place in cases 
where jurisdiction for one authority or the other was not beyond doubt. 
Close cooperation in the Santa Cruz/Microsoft case made evident that the US 
"rule of reason" approach to restrictions in contracts would make it more difficult to 
attack the behaviour at issue in the US courts than under EC legal standards. Conversely 
as regards remedies, an Undertaking given to the Commission is not directly enforceable, 
in the way that the US consent decree is. 
v) Avoiding conflicting remedies 
In the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan case the parties were prepared, once 
negotiations had reached a certain point, to allow discussions to take place between the 
antitrust authorities on the proposed remedies. This was valuable in ensuring an element 
of coordination which might not otherwise have been possible. In particular it ensured 
that the remedies finally agreed upon in each of the jurisdictions were consistent with 
one another. 
Although the FTC was not concerned about remedies in the Boeing/MDD case, as 
they would eventually clear the merger, the Commission, which was looking very 
closely at some form of divestiture of DAC, informed the FTC of such a possibility. 
However, as the FTC expressed reservations on the feasibility of such a remedy, , and 
given that the Commission's enquiry showed that there was no potential buyer for DAC, 
the Commission informed the FTC that it would take into account its concerns and 
would therefore abandon the idea of DAC's divestiture. 
12 
vi) Traditional comity 
The Commission notified to the US authorities on 26 June 1997 its preliminary 
conclusions and concerns in the Boeing/MDD case and asked the FTC to take account of 
the European Union's important interests in safeguarding competition in the market for 
large civil aircraft. The FTC responded the same day indicating that the FTC would take 
into account the expressed interests of the European Communities when reaching its 
decision. On 1 July 1997, the Federal Trade Commission reached a majority decision not 
to oppose the merger. 
vii) Participation of US antitrust authorities in the Commission's hearings 
Following requests put forward by the Federal Trade Commission, officials from 
the US authority were authorised by the Hearing Officer to take part as observers in the 
public hearings held pursuant to the EC Merger Regulation in the framework of the 
examination of the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan merger. Further the Us Department of 
Justice requested and was granted attendance (as observer) at the hearing in the 
Boeing/MDD merger. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The services of the two antitrust authorities on both sides perceive frequent 
contacts and discussions as particularly useful. They help clarify the understanding of the 
issues involved. It was considered efficient and useful to have an idea of how the US 
enforcement agencies intended to respond to certain events in a competition case. 
Despite the limited amount of information that we are able to exchange, except when 
waivers are obtained, the Commission and the two US antitrust authorities benefit from 
being able to behave in a consistent manner, to avoid conflicting decisions and 
incoherent remedies, and to obtain quicker decisions. 
13 
ANNEX 1 
NOTIFICATIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE US 
AUTHORITIES 01.01.1997-31.12.1997 
Merger cases14: 
01 Case IV/M.882 - Archer-Daniels-Midland / Grace Cocoa Associates 
02 Case IV/M.890 - BlokkerAToys "R" Us 
03 Case IV/M.867 - Wagons-Lits/Carlson 
04 Case IV/M.846 - Philips/Hewlett-Packard 
05 Case IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
06 Case IV/M.856 - BT/MCI (H) 
07 Case IV/M.905 - Schweizer Ruck/S.A.F.R. 
08 Case IV/M.833 - The Coca-Cola company/Carlsberg A/S 
09 Case IV/M.902 - Warner Bros./Lusomundo/Sogecable 
10 Case IV/M.920 - Samsung/AST 
11 Case IV/M.915 - Tyco/ADT 
12 Case IV/M.906 - Mannesmann /Vallourec 
13 Case IV/M.917 - Valinox/Timet 
14 Case IV/M.938 - Guinness/Grand Metropolitan 
15 Case IV/M.933 - ICI/Unilever 
16 Case IV/M.936 - SIEBE PLC/APV PLC 
17 Case IV/M.885 - MERCK/RHÔNE-POULENC/MERIAL 
18 Case IV/M.951 - CABLE AND WHŒLESS/MAERSK DATA-NAUTEC 
19 CaseIV/M937-LEAR/KEIPER 
20 Case IV/M.932 - SEHB/VIAG/PE-BEWAG 
21 Case IV/M.942 - VEBA/DEGUSSA 
22 Case IV/M.941 - ADM/ACATOS & HUTCHESON/SOYA MAINZ 
23 Case IV/M.963 - COMPAQ/TANDEM 
24 Case IV/M.723 - ALCOA/ELKEM 
25 Case IV/M.966 - Philips/Lucent Technologies 
26 Case IV/M.954 - BAIN/HOECHST - DADE BEHRING 
27 Case IV/M.977 - Fujitsu/Amdahl 
28 Case IV/M.984 - DUPONT/ICI 
29 Case IV/M.950 - Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim 
30 Case IV/M. 1016 - Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand 
14
 Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list includes only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public 
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ANNEX 1 (continued) 
NOTIFICATIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE US 
AUTHORITIES 01.01.1997-31.12.1997 
Non-merger cases15: 
01 Case IV/36.365 - NEC/PB/CMB 
02 Case IV/36.213/F - GEAE / P&W 
03 Case IV/E-3/36.204 - GENUSA 
04 Case IV/36.420 - Microsoft Explorer Licensing 
05 Case IV/36.365 - NEC/PB/CMB 
06 Case IV/36.382 - Santa Cruz Operation/Microsoft 
07 CaseIV/36.474-IBM/STET 
08 Case IV/35.969 - Canal+ - GDI - TINTA 
09 Case IV/36610/ - Sanofi Pharma Bristol - Myers 
15
 Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list includes only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public 
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ANNEX2 
NOTIFICATIONS BY US AUTHORITIES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
01.01.1997-31.12.1997 
Merger cases16 
01 The Boeing Comp./McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
02 Metal Levé S. AYMahle GmbH 
03 Cargill Inc/Akzo Nobel N. V. 
04 Guinness/Grand Metropolitan 
05 British Telecommunications/MCI Communications Corp. 
06 Corange Ltd./Dr.H.C. Paul Sacher 
16
 Due to the confidentiality requirements, (his list includes only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public 
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ANNEX 2 (continued) 
Non-merger cases17 
01 Hoffinann-La Roche, Jungbunzlauer International AG 
02 Sodium gluconate investigation 
03 International Association of Conference Interpreters 
04 SKW Metals & Alloys 
05 AIG Trading Corp./BP Exploration & Oil Inc/Cargill International SA 
06 HeereMac Offshore Construction Group Inc/HeereMac 
07 Graphite electrodes investigation 
17
 Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list includes only those investigations or cases which have 
been made public 
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